Dreams and Nightmares: Georgia Navigates Russia-Europe Tensions in the South Caucasus

Still image from Bloomberg Television report on Georgia protests in November 2024. 

For the past few months, the world has been watching mass protests unfold in Georgia. These actions represent more than just opposition to the current government; they also reflect a deeper struggle over the country’s future. Caught between European integration and growing Russian influence, Georgians continue to push back against years of Kremlin-led democratic erosion. Their fight extends beyond Russia, shaping Georgia’s place in a shifting global order where the European Union (EU), the United States, and China also hold powerful influence.

A recent history of political turmoil

The unrest began in 2024 when the government, led by the ruling conservative Georgian Dream party, passed two highly controversial laws: the "foreign agents" law and the ban on LGBT "propaganda" and gender reassignment. Protesters have condemned these laws as "Russian" and "Kremlin-backed," while the EU urged Georgia to "recommit to the EU integration path."

Tensions escalated further after Georgian Dream, in power for over 12 years, claimed victory in the latest elections held in October 2024. Independent polls conducted by American firms Edison Research and HarrisX estimated that actual support for the Georgian Dream stood at just over 40 percent, while official results released by the government placed it at 53.92 percent. 

The European Parliament refused to recognize the election results. The Georgian government, in turn, announced a freeze on EU integration until 2028, sparking even larger protests.

The opposition, largely driven by Gen Z activists, is resisting Georgia’s perceived shift toward Russia. Protesters carry banners with slogans like “No to Russia, Yes to Europe,” “Stop Russia,” and “We Are Europe.”

Historical context

Russia’s influence in Georgia dates back to the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union.  However, compared to Central Asia and other South Caucasus republics, Georgia has historically maintained a distance from Russia, especially culturally. The Russian language, for example, never held the same dominant status in Georgia as it did elsewhere in the post-Soviet space. 

After the USSR's collapse, Georgia became one of the few former Soviet states to pursue a distinctly pro-Western path. It applied for NATO membership in 2002 and later applied to join the EU in 2022.

Yet, despite this trajectory, Russian influence remains deeply embedded in the country. It is evident in the ruling party's policies, its pro-Kremlin rhetoric, and the support it enjoys within a very divided electorate. 

While it seems like Georgia’s 30-year journey toward EU integration unraveled in just a few months, the reality is more complex. This crisis is the culmination of a long, strategic effort by Russia to weaken Georgia’s democratic institutions and steer it away from the West. The key question remains: How has Russia managed to sustain its influence over Georgia?

The influence of Russian propaganda 

For years, Russia has waged what experts call a hybrid war in Georgia, combining military aggression with information warfare.The Kremlin’s first major campaign of this kind took place during the Russian invasion of Georgia in 2008. This war was a result of Russia’s support for the separatist regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia—parts of Georgia that attempted to secede following the collapse of the USSR. The conflict ended with Russia unilaterally recognizing the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, while Georgia and the international community regard this as an occupation. 

The Russian army in Georgia during the war in 2008. (Photo: Giorgi Abdaladze, CC BY-SA 4.0, via Wikimedia Commons)

In 2008, the Kremlin carried out cyberattacks on about 60 government and media websites, spreading propaganda and disrupting communications. Since then, Russia has deeply entrenched itself in Georgia through pro-Russian political parties, NGOs, and media outlets. Georgian pro-Russian media, such as Georgia and World (geworld) and Obieqtivi, actively push Kremlin narratives, while Russian state-controlled outlets like Sputnik also operate within the country. National security and cybersecurity researcher Otar Kvirikashvili argues that Russian intelligence “have infiltrated every cell of the state”, with the current government acting as an ally in Moscow’s efforts.  

According to Kvirikashvili, Russia has attacked Georgia’s legislative and electoral systems and manipulated the 2024 parliamentary elections. “They also infiltrated educational programs,” he says, “erasing nearly all references to Russian aggression and Georgian resistance, even going so far as to remove works by the country’s greatest classic writers.”

This systematic effort extends to daily disinformation, mirroring tactics used by Russia in other targeted countries. Kremlin propaganda portrays the West as depraved and a threat to Georgia’s traditions. It frames EU integration as a danger to national identity, warning that it would lead to war, mass migration, and moral decay. The West is accused of promoting same-sex marriage and undermining the Orthodox Church, while Russia positions itself as the defender of Georgian values under the concept of the “Russian world.”  

Moreover, research shows that pro-Russian media in Georgia publish even more anti-Western content than media in Russia. Kvirikashvili claims that in addition to spreading its narratives through pro-Russian media, the Kremlin, with the help of the Georgian government, controls major propaganda TV channels, fuels countless conspiracy theories, and actively deploys trolls and bots. “Despite the rise of online media and the digital age,” he notes, “they operate massive troll and bot factories, employing thousands from the public sector to foster a culture of hatred.”

Should we blame everything on Russia?  

While Russia’s influence in Georgia is undeniable, some experts contend that not all of the country’s political shifts can be attributed to Kremlin propaganda. For instance, Columbia University researcher Lincoln Mitchell argues that this propaganda alone cannot explain support for the Georgian Dream.  

“Russia indeed pushes a narrative, saying Europe means that your son’s going to have to be gay. But many Georgians choose to believe that regardless of Russian rhetoric,” he explains. “Russia is flooding Georgia with disinformation, just as they do in the United States because these countries provide fertile ground for it – there are already people with those views.”  

According to Mitchell, Russia did not play a decisive role in the 2024 elections. He believes that if the Georgian Dream had not introduced the foreign agents law, winning would have been easier for them. He also avoids calling the Georgian Dream a Russian project. “The party’s founder, Bidzina Ivanishvili, is a ‘Putinist’ in his understanding of the world and politics, but that doesn’t mean the party itself is a Russian project,” he clarifies.  

Georgian Dream founder Bidzina Ivanishvili speaks at an April 2024 rally in Tbilisi in support of the “foreign agent law.” (Photo: Jelger Groeneveld, CC BY 2.0, via Wikimedia Commons)

For Lincoln, the Georgian Dream’s shift toward Russia is best understood as an inevitable consequence of Western pressure for democratic reforms, combined with uncertainty about the country’s future.  

“The U.S. and Europe have been telling Georgia for 20 years that NATO and EU membership is just around the corner, but it never was,” he emphasizes. “Over time, the Georgian Dream grew tired of Western pressure to be democratic, while Russia felt like a more familiar and comfortable alternative. Gradually, they pushed out pro-Western voices and ended up aligning with Russia.”  

Mitchell also predicts that the West is unlikely to protect Georgia if Russia poses a military threat, just as it failed to act in 2008. The situation has only worsened, he says, with newly elected U.S. President Donald Trump strengthening ties with Russia.

A changing U.S. role?  

While the EU and the U.S. have sometimes remained passive on key issues, their contributions to Georgia’s development cannot be overlooked. Kvirikashvili notes that they “have done a great deal over the past 30 years to support Georgia's integration with the West, strengthening institutions and supporting the media and non-governmental sectors.”   

When it comes to information influence, Mitchell highlights the stark contrast between Russia and the West: while Russia pours funds into propaganda, the West has invested in fostering independent, high-quality media in Georgia. “The U.S. has poured millions of dollars into Georgia’s civil society organizations that work to expose and counter disinformation campaigns,” he points out. “But from a Western perspective, there’s no need to spread disinformation. If you want to show people how terrible Putin is – just show them videos of what’s happening in Ukraine.”  

However, with Trump’s return to the White House and his close relationship with Vladimir Putin, Mitchell warns that the U.S. may now actively enable Russian disinformation campaigns – not only in Georgia but also in Ukraine, the United Kingdom, and even within the U.S. itself.

Vladimir Putin and Donald Trump at the 2017 G-20 Hamburg Summit. (Photo: Kremlin.ru, CC BY 4.0, via Wikimedia Commons)

Even before Trump's return to the White House, U.S. policy toward Georgia had already begun to shift. In 2024, the Biden administration suspended $95 million in aid to Georgia in response to the country’s adoption of the foreign agents law. Then, in February 2025, the Trump administration took an even more drastic step, terminating over 90% of USAID contracts worldwide, including those in Georgia. Mitchell called this a grave mistake, arguing that these funds were instrumental in helping Georgia combat Russian propaganda.  

Countering Russian disinformation in Georgia is now more difficult than ever. As Kvirikashvili points out, beyond the information war, the Georgian government has also disrupted U.S. and U.K.-funded cybersecurity programs. “Russia has an extremely sophisticated cyber-offensive capability, honed since the 1990s, and has carried out major cyberattacks against leading countries over the past 15 years. Our situation is dire – the country faces a significant threat,” he warns.  

China’s role in Georgia

Beyond Russia and the West, other global players have also set their sights on Georgia. 

Kvirikashvili notes that China has strategic interests in the country, particularly in the construction of the Anaklia deep-sea port. This project is crucial for Georgia’s economic and political development, strengthening its role as one of the key transit hubs between Europe and Asia. 

Last year, Georgia handed over the project to a Chinese-Singaporean consortium. However, Mitchell argues that despite this investment, Georgia remains primarily within the sphere of Russian influence. “Georgia is not a central concern for China. Yes, there is Chinese investment, but China invests everywhere. The Chinese government will work with whoever is in power in Georgia – even if it’s an opposition leader who comes to power,” he explains.

What’s next for Georgia?

Today, Georgia is perhaps as far from the EU as ever, with little sign of improvement soon. Recently, the Georgian Parliament approved amendments to the broadcasting law in its second reading, banning foreign funding of TV channels and introducing new requirements for their broadcasting “standards.” Following this, the Georgian Dream party proposed additional regulations on online media funding.

“In this context, it will become even more difficult to counter propaganda and disinformation using the methods we have relied on so far,” says Kvirikashvili. He warns that without support from the EU and the U.S., the Georgian government – aligned with Russia – will succeed in isolating the country, making it easier to dictate its future. 

For his part, Mitchell points out that despite this, the people of Georgia continue to fight for democracy, even as they find themselves without foreign allies.

Post-election protests in Tbilisi on 28 October 2024. (Photo: Jelger Groeneveld, CC BY 2.0, via Wikimedia Commons)

At the same time, he argues that if the EU does not want Georgia to become “a Russian satellite,” it will eventually have to act. Georgia’s path back toward EU integration, he says, depends on two possible scenarios: “Either this regime is forced out and a more democratic one comes to power – that would be great. Or, if Russia invades Georgia because that will make the EU interested again.”

Both researchers believe that Russia has largely achieved its objectives in Georgia. However, Kvirikashvili emphasizes that a significant portion of the Georgian population remains defiant: “This is a battle for survival – if we surrender, we will lose our state. We do not accept open aggression that no longer even resembles hybrid warfare. Russia has practically achieved all its goals – except one. They could not break the Georgian people.”

Leyla Eminova

Leyla Eminova is an Azerbaijani journalist specializing in human-centered stories, social issues, gender equality, and the post-Soviet region. She also has a strong interest in solution-oriented and data journalism. Currently, she is pursuing a Master's degree in Politics and Communication at the University of Amsterdam as an Erasmus Mundus scholarship recipient.

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